Ambition and Abdication: Congress, the Presidency, and the Evolution of the Department of Homeland Security by Stanhouse, Darren W.
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 29 | Number 4 Article 4
Summer 2004
Ambition and Abdication: Congress, the
Presidency, and the Evolution of the Department of
Homeland Security
Darren W. Stanhouse
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Darren W. Stanhouse, Ambition and Abdication: Congress, the Presidency, and the Evolution of the Department of Homeland Security, 29
N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 691 (2003).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol29/iss4/4
Ambition and Abdication: Congress, the Presidency, and the Evolution of
the Department of Homeland Security
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This comments is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation:
http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol29/iss4/4
Ambition and Abdication: Congress, The Presidency,
and the Evolution of the Department of Homeland
Security
I. Introduction
When President George W. Bush called on Congress to create
a new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in June of 2002,'
he likened his proposal to the massive reorganization of disparate
federal intelligence and military agencies that followed the
passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA'-). 2 In a
televised address to the nation, Bush compared the country's post-
September 11 plight to that faced by Harry S. Truman at the
conclusion of the Second World War: "Truman recognized that
our nation's fragmented defenses had to be reorganized to win the
Cold War. He proposed uniting our military forces under a single
Department of Defense and creating the National Security Council
to bring together defense, intelligence, and diplomacy."3 Now,
Bush said, it was time for Congress to enact "similar dramatic
reforms to secure our people at home."4
It is true that President Truman faced an awesome challenge in
the years following World War II. He had learned, from the
experiences of the war and its aftermath, that if the United States
was to effectively transition into the world power it seemed
destined to become, it would have to forge unifying policy
directives for its historically autonomous military branches.' The
country would also have to overcome its longstanding reluctance
to engage in foreign intelligence activity if it were to win the Cold
I Bush Wants Broad 'Homeland Security' Overhaul, June 7, 2002, at http://www.
cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/06/06/bush.security.
2 National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 402 (2003).
3 David Greenberg, The Truman Show, June 13, 2002, at http://slate.msn.com/
id/2066942/.
4 Id.
5 See, e.g., Frank N. Trager, The National Security Act of 1947: Its Thirtieth
Anniversary, 29 AIR U. REV. 2, 5-9 (1977), available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.
af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1977/nov-dec/trager.html.
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War.6 The NSA addressed these needs by structuring a joint
command for the Navy, Army, and Air Force in the Department of
Defense, and by creating the National Security Council and the
Central Intelligence Agency.7 In centralizing the command of
these departments, the Act also solidified the presidency's vast
institutional power over foreign affairs.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 paved the way for
a similar transfer of domestic power to the executive branch.
Following the attacks, it soon became clear that the United States'
Cold War-era intelligence and domestic security infrastructure
needed another overhaul.8 But it was not at all clear what
particular structure that overhaul should take. From the beginning,
Congress and the executive branch had sharply contrasting ideas
about how best to shore up national security.9 Given the
widespread perception that U.S. intelligence had failed in the
months leading up to the attacks, both branches agreed that the
various agencies responsible for the nation's defense needed to be
unified in their missions and objectives." But behind the national
security objectives were other concerns. While both Congress and
the White House envisioned an agency that would capitalize on
effective intelligence gathering and strengthening domestic
security, their respective ideas also reflected institutional concerns
unique to each branch. Given the fundamental reallocation of
authority that would accompany the creation of the agency that
would ultimately oversee domestic security, each branch stood to
gain - or lose - significant institutional power.
The evolution of the Department of Homeland Security has, in
many ways, been a struggle for constitutional power between
Congress and the Presidency. Since September 2001, both
branches have forwarded plans with provisions that would extend
- or at a minimum, shore up - their respective institutional
6 See id. at 9-10.
7 See National Security Act of 1947 §§ 401, 402, 403.
8 See Harold C. Relyea, Homeland Security: The Concept and the Presidential
Coordination Office-First Assessment, 32 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 397, 397-99 (2002).
9 See id. at 411. By the end of 2001, several bills had been introduced that would
establish some type of statutory homeland security department. Id. The bills were
introduced by both chambers of Congress and were authored by both Republicans and
Democrats. Id.
10 See id. at 399.
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powers. Each branch has relied on different constitutional
methods, with varying degrees of success, to forward its goals.
This Comment will examine the effect of those methods that have
already been employed, and those that likely will be implemented
in the future, and analyze the implications - not only for the
American Congress and the presidency, but also for transparent,
democratic government in general. This Comment will conclude
that, just as the NSA bolstered the institutional power of the
presidency over foreign affairs, the Homeland Security Act
(HSA)11 has given the executive branch an unprecedented level of
control over domestic policy and practice.
II. The Evolution of the Department of Homeland Security
In terms of the struggle for power, Congress was at a
disadvantage from the beginning, despite its traditional strength in
the realm of domestic affairs. 12 In the wake of the devastating
attacks of September 11, the country was clearly rallying behind
the President. 3 Throughout American history, wartime has
traditionally been a low point for congressional power, and a high
point for the presidency.' 4 By virtue of his Commander-in-Chief
power, his preeminence in the realm of foreign affairs, and
perhaps most importantly, his unique institutional ability to "speak
with one voice," the President is the natural figure for the nation to
stand behind in times of war.15
11 Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C § 101 (2002).
12 See generally Kirk Victor, Congress in Eclipse, 35 NAT'L J. 1066 (2003).
13 See Michael Nelson, George W. Bush and Congress: The Electoral Connection,
32 PERSP. ON POL. SCI. 157, 160 (2003). Following the September 11 attacks, President
Bush's approval ratings shot up thirty-five percentage points "virtually overnight,"
peaking at around ninety percent. Id. Bush's ninety percent approval rating was the
highest that any president had ever achieved. Id.
14 Victor, supra note 12, at 1069. Michael Nelson observes:
Presidents typically receive short-term boosts in public approval as a result of
the "rally round-the-flag" effect, which John E. Mueller has defined as "being
associated with an event which (1) is international and (2) involves the United
States and particularly the president directly; and it must be (3) specific,
dramatic, and sharply focused."
Nelson, supra note 13, at 160 (quoting JOHN E. MUELLER, WAR, PRESIDENTS, AND
PUBLIC OPINION (Wiley 1973)).
15 See Victor, supra note 12, at 1068-69; Nelson, supra note 13, at 161.
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The Bush Administration was aware of its advantage. By early
October 2001, the President had established the Office of
Homeland Security (OHS) by Executive Order, 6 and had
appointed Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge as its director.17 The
purpose of OHS, according to Bush, was "to coordinate the
executive branch's efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect
against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the
United States."' 18
But while Congress had acquiesced to the President on most
national security matters since September 11,19 the Homeland
Security issue, which "lay at the intersection of national security
policy and domestic policy," was not an easy sell.20 Almost
immediately, critical voices arose from the other end of
Pennsylvania Avenue. Senators and Representatives from both
sides of the aisle worried that the OHS's mission was too broad,
that it was too insulated from congressional oversight, and that
Ridge had too little authority to carry out his mission effectively.2'
Because OHS was created within the Executive Office of the
President, Bush did not have to seek the advice and consent of the
Senate when appointing its officers.22 Furthermore, Bush could
fund OHS with discretionary White House funds, bypassing the
congressional appropriations process for agencies, and largely
insulate Ridge (technically a presidential advisor) from
congressional oversight by calling upon executive privilege.23
16 Exec. Order No. 13,228, 3 C.F.R. 796 (2001).
17 See Thomas Cmar, Recent Development, Office of Homeland Security, 39 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 455, 455 (2002).
18 Id.
19 Post-September 11 congressional acquiescence was perhaps most apparent in the
swift passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, which was signed into law in October 2001.
See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 13, at 160-61.
20 Id. at 161.
21 See Relyea, supra note 8, at 410.
22 See id. at 401.
23 See id. In his June 2002 article, Relyea noted:
[B]ecause it has a presidential mandate and its leader is a member of the White
House Office staff, OHS may be funded, in large or small part, from
discretionary monies available to the president or amounts from the White
House Office budget, with the result that congressional overseers and
appropriators may have difficulty determining the adequacy of the OHS budget.
(Vol. 29
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Indeed, within the first few months of the Office's existence, the
Administration frequently dodged requests from Congress to have
Ridge testify regarding his activities as director.24
Both Democratic and Republican members of Congress began
calling for the creation of a cabinet-level agency, and for a
statutory grant of power to Ridge that would give him more
autonomy from the executive branch. 25 Creating a cabinet-level
department would also presumably give Congress more oversight
and influence over the new agency's activities.26 At first, the Bush
Administration vehemently opposed the idea.27 But by spring of
2002, pressure from Congress and unfolding revelations
concerning the continuing inadequacies of intelligence
coordination began to diminish the President's resistance. 28 As it
became clear that a cabinet-level Department of Homeland
Security would be increasingly difficult to avoid, the
Administration took the reins and made its proposal to Congress in
June of 2002.
During the summer of 2002 and into the fall election season,
the Administration and Congress went back and forth over the
details of the new agency's structure and mission.29 President Bush
attempted to tap the nation's still-waxing patriotism by calling on
Congress to pass his version of the Homeland Security Act by
September 11, 2002, the one-year anniversary of the attacks on the
Pentagon and World Trade Center.30 West Virginia Senator Robert
Id.
24 Press Release, Sen. Joseph Lieberman, Statement by Chairman Lieberman on
Establishing a National Department of Homeland Security (Apr. 11, 2002), available at
http:/lieberman.senate.gov/press/02/04/2002411658.html [hereinafter Lieberman
Statement].
25 See id.; see also Bush Wants Broad 'Homeland Security' Overhaul, supra note 1;
Relyea, supra note 8, at 410-11.
26 See Relyea, supra note 8, at 410-11; Richard E. Cohen et al., The Ultimate Turf
War, 35 NAT'L J. 16 (2003).
27 See, e.g., Bush Wants Broad 'Homeland Security' Overhaul, supra note 1.
28 See id.
29 See Jonathan Thessin, Recent Development, Department of Homeland Security,
40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 513 (2003) (detailing the recommendations of the Hart Rudman
Commission and the Gilmore Commission); Lieberman Statement, supra note 24.
30 See 148 CONG. REC. S8041-S8048 (2002) (statement of Sen. Byrd) [hereinafter
Byrd Statement].
2004]
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Byrd characterized the President's efforts as an attempt to strong-
arm Congress:
The President's proposal has been barreling through Congress
like a Mack truck, threatening to run over anyone who dares to
stand in its way. And Congress, so far, has cleared a path and
cheered on this rumbling big rig, without stopping to think
seriously about where it is ultimately headed.3'
Despite these expressions of indignation from Byrd and other
senators, the President ultimately prevailed. The Republican-
controlled House had passed a version of the bill3" that was very
sympathetic to the President's wishes on June 24, 2002, by a vote
of 295 to 132 .3 The bill was then received by the Democrat-
controlled Senate, which successfully resisted signing it for
several months.34 But in early November, the Republicans won
back the Senate, albeit by a slim margin, and the Democrats
seemed to lose their will to fight. On November 19, 2002, the
Senate signed off on a compromised version of the bill, and the
President signed it into law on November 25.
In The Imperial Presidency,36 Arthur Schlesinger identified
three factors that allowed President Richard Nixon to expand his
institutional powers in the context of war: (1) assertions of
executive privilege; (2) conducting covert operations; and (3)
Congress's abdication of its institutional war making powers.37
While the struggle between Congress and the Presidency in the
context of the HSA did not directly concern the War Powers, the
spirit of secrecy, presidential autonomy, and congressional
abdication implicit in Schlesinger's observations is applicable.
Much of the HSA debate surrounded the Administration's efforts
to extend its power by controlling and insulating information from
congressional - and thus public - scrutiny.38 Similarly, President
31 Id.
32 H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. (2002).
33 Thessin, supra note 29, at n.2.
34 Id.; see also Byrd Statement, supra note 30.
35 See Thessin, supra note 29, at n. 1.
36 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (2d ed., Houghton
Mifflin Company 1989) (1973).
37 See id.
38 See Victor, supra note 12.
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Bush pushed for broad authority and "flexibility" in the
management of DIS employees. Specifically, the Administration
fought for the ability to suspend traditional labor and civil rights
protections for federal employees when the President or Secretary
of Defense determined that national security required it.39 This
"flexibility" extended the President's autonomous discretion,
further insulating the executive branch from public scrutiny.
Congressional acquiescence made this historic power shift
possible.
Philip Bobbitt has observed that a fundamental ethos of the
Constitution is the notion of self-government, which posits that the
government's "limited sovereignty derives from delegation by the
people, who are wholly sovereign., 40 A corollary, Professor
Bobbitt notes, is that the people must be able to "affirm actions
taken in their name" through the electoral process.4 This is only
possible, of course, if the people know what the government is
doing.42 "A democracy cannot... tolerate secret policies, because
they are robbed of the legitimacy our institutions confer."43
When the executive branch extends its power by insulating
information and policies from public scrutiny, Congress is in the
unique position to check that power by insisting on transparency.
44
In the battles over the shape of the Department of Homeland
Security, Congress's efforts in this realm failed. The Bush
Administration won unprecedented levels of control over
information, intelligence, and internal management at the new
Department because Congress abdicated much of its institutional
authority to prevent it.
39 See infra Part IV.
40 Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and
Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REV.
1364, 1393 (1994).
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1394.
44 See Victor, supra note 12.
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III. The Struggle for Information
A. Congressional Oversight Generally
The Bush Administration's reluctance to share information
regarding Homeland Security with Congress was notable from the
beginning. 5 Controlling information in the name of security is one
of the key devices Bush has used to shore up the institutional
power of the presidency. By insulating executive activity from
public and congressional scrutiny, the Administration has gained
significant freedom to conduct its policymaking according to its
own objectives. This strategy has been successful largely because
Congress has chosen to acquiesce in the Administration's demands
for secrecy.
4 6
Congress has the constitutional power to delegate
discretionary, budgetary, and policymaking authority to the
executive branch through the creation of administrative agencies.47
Congress is not allowed to make such a delegation unless it
provides a legislatively enacted "intelligible principle" to guide an
agency in the exercise of its discretion.48 Once the statutory
delegation is made, Congress retains several institutional controls
over agency action.49 Direct controls include the power to overrule
agency decisions through subsequent legislation, statutorily alter
an agency's jurisdiction, and utilize appropriations to limit what an
agency can do with its funding.5" The Senate also exercises
considerable influence over agencies through its constitutional
45 See Panel Plans Subpoena for Records Tied to 9/11, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 8, 2003, at
C13; Victor, supra note 12. Victor tracks the ongoing parrying between Congress and
the Bush Administration over requests for information, including the Justice
Department's implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act, Tom Ridge's activities as
Director of the OHS, and Vice President Cheney's battles with the GAO. Id.
46 See Victor, supra note 12.
47 See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (rejecting a challenge to the
Secretary of Agriculture's authority to impose fines under a broad delegation of power);
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) (congressional grant to the executive branch of
power to impose tariffs when president determined they were necessary is
constitutional).
48 See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
49 See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 3.1 (3d
ed. 1999).
50 Id.
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authority to provide "advice and consent" on executive
appointments." Less formally, Congress can influence agencies
politically through oversight committees, investigatory hearings,
direct contacts with agency officers, and by pressuring the
president to appoint officers who fall in line with congressional
expectations. 2
Congress's ability to provide oversight to the DHS has been a
key factor in that Department's evolution. From the beginning,
Congress has pushed for more transparency, and the
administration has repeatedly balked.53 Soon after the formation of
the OHS, Congress began issuing requests for information from
then-OHS Director Ridge. 4 In March of 2002, Republican Senator
Ted Stevens and Democratic Senator Robert Byrd invited Ridge to
testify before the Senate Appropriations Committee.55 The
President announced that Ridge would not appear.56 Since the
OHS existed within the Executive Office of the Presidency, the
White House informed Stevens and Byrd, Ridge had the status of a
presidential advisor rather than a cabinet-level appointee.57 It was
the Administration's position that "members of the President's
staff do not ordinarily testify before congressional committees.""
In subsequent communications with the senators, Ridge
indicated that he would be willing to offer a compromise that
would "avoid the setting of a precedent that could undermine the
constitutional separation of powers and the long-standing
traditions and practices of both Congress and the executive
branch."59 Ridge offered to meet informally with Senate and
House members for the purpose of providing a public briefing on
OHS activities." At the briefing, Ridge assured his critics,
51 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
52 See PIERCE, JR. ET AL., supra note 49, § 3.1.
53 See, e.g., Byrd Statement, supra note 30.
54 See Louis Fisher, Congressional Access to Information: Using Legislative Will
and Leverage, 52 DuKE L.J. 323, 398-400 (2002).
55 Id. at 398.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. (quoting White House liaison Nicholas Calio).
59 Id. at 399.
60 Id.
20041
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members of Congress would be free to ask him questions."
Presumably, the less formal environment of the "briefing" would
allow Ridge to maintain control of the agenda. Ridge explained
that he was happy to meet with lawmakers in "briefings," but not
in "hearings. 62
The President was calling upon executive privilege to insulate
Ridge's activities and communications from formal congressional
review.63 In United States v. Nixon,' the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized that certain information is subject to the protections of
executive privilege.65 However, the Court held that those
protections are not absolute in all circumstances.66 When
challenged in the context of a criminal prosecution, for instance,
the Court will apply a balancing test to determine whether
information is privileged. It will evaluate the importance of
disclosure against the President's need to keep the information
confidential.67 Nixon had serious implications for the institutional
strength of the presidency. Congress can now, in the context of a
criminal prosecution, challenge assertions of presidential privilege,
and the President would be obliged to argue his case before a
federal court in camera.
Beyond criminal prosecutions, Congress has other checks
against executive power in its constitutional arsenal. As the Court
noted in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,6 8 Congress can check the president
through control of the budget, oversight, political pressure (via the
media, for example), and impeachment.69 But in order for these
checks against presidential power to have any effect, Congress
must be willing and able to use them. In the case of the Bush
61 Id.
62 Id. at 399-400.
63 See Relyea, supra note 8.
64 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
65 Id. at 705.
66 Id. at 706. The Court noted that "neither the doctrine of separation of powers,
nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain
an absolute, unqualified presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under
all circumstances." Id.
67 Id. at 711.
68 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
69 Id. at 757.
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Administration's assertions of OHS privilege, neither of those
prerequisites was satisfied.
As the OHS and DHS have evolved, Congress has repeatedly
backed down from any meaningful challenges to the President's
attempts to extend power to the executive branch.7" Faced with a
popular wartime president citing the need for tight domestic
security as his motivation, Congress has effectively abdicated
much of its institutional oversight authority.7 The major
consequence is that the Administration has largely been able to
have its way in structuring the new Department.72 As the bill that
would eventually become the HSA made its way through
Congress, the President exerted considerable influence over its
architecture and successfully protected his ability to maintain firm
control over information and intelligence.
B. Self-Policing
The debate over the Department's authority to police itself and
oversee investigations of complaints of civil rights violations was
one area where these maneuvers were played out. Section 705 of
the HSA establishes an Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
who has authority to "review and assess information alleging
abuses of civil rights, civil liberties, and racial and ethnic profiling
by employees and officials of the Department."73 This Officer is
appointed by, and reports directly to, the Secretary of Homeland
Security.74 Because he is directly appointed by the Secretary, this
Officer is not subject to Senate approval.75 Congress and the public
are further insulated from the activities of this Officer by another
provision in the Act, which only requires the Secretary to account
for the activities of this Officer in his annual report to Congress.76
70 See Victor, supra note 12. Victor quotes Sen. Byrd for the proposition that, in the
midst of the War on Terror, Congress is "sleepwalking through history." Id.
71 See id.
72 See id.; Nelson, supra note 13.
73 Homeland Security Act, 6 U.S.C. § 705(a)(1) (2002).
74 Id.
75 See id.; Byrd Statement, supra note 30.
76 Homeland Security Act § 705(b). Section 705(b) provides in full:
The Secretary shall submit to the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and the appropriate committees and subcommittees
2004]
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In his statement of September 3, 2002, Senator Byrd said that
allowing the Secretary this much control over internal
investigations puts the "fox in charge of the hen house."" The
Secretary, Byrd noted, is under no real obligation to actually
follow up on civil rights complaints - only to report them to
Congress in his annual reports.78
The HSA also grants the Secretary broad authority and
discretion over the Inspector General.7 9 Specifically, section
811(a) provides that "the Inspector General shall be under the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary with respect to
audits or investigations, or the issuance of subpoenas, that require
access to sensitive information" related to homeland security.8"
The Act enumerates a number of specific areas of "sensitive
information"'" that trigger the Secretary's discretion, but ends by
giving the Secretary broad authority over any "other matters the
disclosure of which would, in the Secretary's judgment, constitute
a serious threat to national security."82 With respect to this
"sensitive information," the Secretary can prohibit the Inspector
General's investigations if he "determines that such prohibition is
necessary to prevent the disclosure of any information described in
subsection (a), to preserve the national security, or to prevent a
significant impairment to the interests of the United States."83
In short, the Secretary has complete authority to bring any
investigation to a halt, at his discretion. But the Act does allow for
some oversight of the Secretary's discretion by Congress. If the
of Congress on an annual basis a report on the implementation of this section,
including the use of funds appropriated to carry out this section, and detailing
any allegations of abuses described under subsection (a)(1) and any action taken
by the Department in response to such allegations.
Id.
77 Byrd Statement, supra note 30.
78 Id.
79 See Homeland Security Act § 811.
80 Id. § 811(a).
81 For example, the Act identifies as "sensitive" information that concerns:
intelligence, counterintelligence, or terrorism; ongoing criminal investigations;
undercover operations; and the identity of confidential sources including protected
witnesses. Id. § 811 (a)(1)-(4).
82 Id. § 811 (a)(6).
83 Id. § 811 (b).
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Secretary exercises his authority to prohibit an investigation by the
Inspector General, he must notify him in writing and the Inspector
General must, in turn, transmit a response and a copy of the notice
to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House.84 The
Act does not, however, provide for any specific disclosures from
the Secretary in his notification. Thus, the Secretary retains
significant discretion over what Congress does or does not know.
As Senator Byrd correctly observes, the Civil Rights Officer and
the Inspector General are not "given enough authority to actually
carry out their jobs."85
In short, the Secretary and the President can largely determine
which Department activities may be disclosed to Congress and
which are insulated in the name of homeland security. This power
gives the executive branch an unprecedented level of information
control in the realm of domestic policy and security. One of the
prevailing theories of the constitutionality of administrative
delegation is founded on transparency.86 When agency action is
transparent - where the agency's procedures are open to
congressional and public scrutiny - the likelihood of an abuse of
power is significantly lessened. In the DHS, many of the checks
that ensure transparency have been undermined.
C. The FOIA Exemption
A striking example of Congress's struggle to maintain
transparency in the DHS arises from debate over the creation of
exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) that
eventually made their way into the HSA.87 According to Vermont
Senator Patrick Leahy, the Republican-authored exemption
provision "guts the FOIA at the expense of our national security
and public health and safety."88 In its initial proposal to Congress
in June 2002, the Administration created a FOIA exemption for
any information "voluntarily" provided to the new Department by
84 Id. § 811 (c).
85 Byrd Statement, supra note 30.
86 See PIERCE JR., ET AL., supra note 49.
87 See Homeland Security Act §§ 211-15; see also Statement of U.S. Senator
Patrick Leahy, The Homeland Security Department Act, Nov. 19, 2002, at http://www.
senate.gov/-leahy/press/200211/111902c.html [hereinafter Leahy Statement].
88 Leahy Statement, supra note 87.
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"non-Federal" entities that pertained to "infrastructure
vulnerabilities or other vulnerabilities to terrorism."89 Senator
Leahy noted that this exemption creates an unprecedented level of
cover for private-sector contractors and businesses.9" The broad
exemption will "encourage government complicity with private
firms to keep secret information about critical infrastructure
vulnerabilities, reduce the incentive to fix the problems and end up
hurting rather than helping our national security."
9
'
On June 26, 2002, the Senate Judiciary Committee queried
Tom Ridge on the exemption.92 Then-OHS Director Ridge
expressed an eagerness to work with the Democrat-controlled
Committee to arrive at a compromise that would be satisfactory to
both the Senate and the Executive.93 During the course of the fall,
the two branches did work together on the provision, and arrived
at a much narrower exemption on July 24. However, following
the Democratic defeat in November, the new majority replaced the
compromise clause with the former broad exemption.95
Under the final version of the HSA, private companies may
designate certain information as "Critical Infrastructure
Information" and "voluntarily" submit this information to the
Department.96 By doing so, the company will obtain an exemption
from the normal public disclosure requirements embodied in the
FOIA.97 If a government employee with access to this information
discloses it, she will face criminal prosecution and possible job
loss under the HSA.
98
This exemption alone grants an enormous level of power to the
executive branch by shielding its activities, and those of "critical
infrastructure" companies, from oversight by Congress and the
public. As Senator Leahy observed:
89 See id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.; Homeland Security Act §§ 211-15.
96 Homeland Security Act §§ 212, 214.
97 Id. § 214.
98 Id. § 214(f).
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This provision means that if a Federal regulatory agency needs
to issue a regulation to protect the public from threats of harm, it
cannot rely on any voluntarily submitted information-bringing
the normal regulatory process to a grinding halt. Public health
and law enforcement officials need the flexibility to decide how
and when to warn or prepare the public in the safest, most
effective manner. They should not have to get [a] "sign off'
from a Fortune 500 company to do so. 99
"Critical infrastructure" covers matters such as electrical grids,
computer systems, and water treatment facilities."° Michigan
Senator Carl Levin pointed out that, under the new Act, polluting
companies can be immunized from civil liability Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) enforcement.'0 ' For example, if the DHS
learns from a chemical company that it is in danger of releasing
toxic gas because of an infrastructure vulnerability, the Act "ties
the hands" of officials, preventing them from sharing the
information with a court or with the EPA. 10 2
One of the separation of powers concerns inherent to
administrative law is the possibility that an agency with delegated
authority will become "captured" by special interests.0 3 The FOIA
exemption illustrates the danger. The Administration's ability to
impose tight controls over public access to information that comes
across the desks of DHS officials opens the way for abuse by
private companies. The concern expressed by Senator Levin is that
companies and issues to which the Bush Administration might be
sympathetic will get a free pass on the regulatory front as a result
of the exemption. 10 4 But the President also has an interest in
allowing the exemption. There is ample precedent in the arena of
regulatory law for the proposition that voluntary compliance with
overarching policies and rules should be rewarded.0 5  By
99 Leahy Statement, supra note 87.
100 Rebecca Daugherty, Homeland Security Act Blocks Unclassified Information
from Public, Protects the Companies that Provide it, NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, winter
2003, at 9, available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/mag/27-1/cov-homelact.html; see also
Homeland Security Act § 212.
101 See Daugherty, supra note 100.
102 Id.
103 See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 49, at 45.
104 See Daugherty, supra note 100.
105 For example, the Clean Water Act has enforcement provisions that allow self-
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protecting critical infrastructure companies that voluntarily report
potential security issues, the overarching objectives of the DHS
are strengthened. But the question arises: when do such
protections go too far and threaten other, more important public
policy interests? A strong case can be made that the FOIA
exemption is just such an overinclusive provision.
Senators, including Democrats Leahy and Levin, and Utah
Republican Robert Bennett, called for more time to debate these
and other provisions of the bill."°6 But for various reasons -
including pressure from the Administration and the Democrats'
loss of a mandate due to their electoral defeat in November - these
voices of opposition were unable to prevail.0 7 In the end, the
Senate signed off on the House bill, which retained many of the
Administration's original provisions.' 8 Secretary Ridge has since
indicated his continued willingness to work with the Congress on
these and other issues, but given that the power has already been
granted, the Administration is now in the position to control the
terms of the debate.
IV. Management Flexibility
Discretion over the Department's personnel was another key
arena in which the institutional battle for power was played out.
The President successfully pushed for significant "managerial
flexibility" over DHS employees.'0 9 Congressional Democrats
believed this flexibility was less a matter of national security than
an opportunity for Republicans to undermine federal employee
unions and workers' rights." The debate over this issue was
fierce, leading to several impasses between Congress and the
policing by potential polluters. If the companies implement an EPA policy-formulated
system of self monitoring, it is possible for them to avoid fines and criminal penalties in
the event of a breach of their permits. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1378 (2003).
106 See Daugherty, supra note 100.
107 See Nelson, supra note 13, at 162. In the midterm elections of 2002, President
Bush utilized his considerable political capital to help several Republicans campaign for
House and Senate seats. Id. Twelve of the sixteen Senate candidates for whom he
campaigned won, as did all but two of the twenty-three House candidates. Id.
Republicans consequently were able to claim a mandate for the President. Id
108 See Victor, supra note 12, at 1066.
109 See Thessin, supra note 29, at 530.
110 See Nelson, supra note 13, at 161.
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executive branch during the fall of 2002."' The final provisions in
the HSA were hailed as a "compromise," but the Administration
retained many of the key components of the "management
flexibility" it had originally requested."
12
Critics of the compromise view the management flexibility
provisions of the HSA as violating the National Labor Relations
Act of 1947."' That Act guarantees workers' rights to "self-
organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations" and to
bargain collectively for better working conditions." 4 Under the
HSA, the President and the Secretary of Homeland Security are
given statutory power to modify civil service protections that
govern hiring, salary, and workplace decisions." 5 Specifically,
section 841 of the Act gives the Secretary the flexibility to adjust
pay, implement performance evaluation and discipline systems,
and to regulate the grievance procedures for Department
employees." 6 If negotiations between the Department and a union
fail after sixty days of negotiations, the Secretary can implement
any changes at his discretion."' Section 842 gives the President
the authority to suspend Department employees' right to organize
within unions and engage in collective bargaining if he concludes
that these rights would interfere with homeland security." 8
Specifically, if the President finds that a union has a "substantial
adverse impact" on homeland security, he can "exclude collective
bargaining units from the Department" ten days after notifying
Congress." 9 For congressional Democrats who see themselves as
the traditional defenders of labor rights, these were particularly
sticky issues. 21 Consequently, they expended significant energy
I I I See Joseph C. Zengerle, The Good News in the Great Debate Over Liberty vs.
Security Is This: the White House, the Courts, and Congress Are Inching Toward
Common Ground, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at 58.
112 See Leahy Statement, supra note 87.
113 See National Labor Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2003).
114 See id.
1l5 Homeland Security Act § 841 (2002).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. § 842.
119 Id. § 842(c).
120 See Zengerle, supra note 111.
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combating these provisions as the HSA evolved during the fall. 2'
Senator Leahy characterized the Administration's push for
"management flexibility" as an abuse of the legislative process.
The President, he said, was using the "the new department as the
excuse to undermine or repeal laws not liked by [Republican]
interests.' 22 Senator Leahy and other Democrats also were
concerned that the new management policies might open the way
for political patronage.'23  The flexibility granted to the
Administration over personnel issues in the new department would
"authorize political cronyism rather than professionalism within
[the DHS].' 24
The Democrats' unwillingness to budge on what they saw as
another erosion of individual rights in the name of homeland
security led to a stalemate going into the November midterm
elections. 125 Several commentators believed the stalemate harmed
the Democrats. 2 6 In Georgia and Missouri, Democratic senators
who had been outspoken on the labor issue lost their seats to
Republicans who had criticized them for not backing President
Bush. 27 When the lame-duck Congress finally passed the bill, it
gave the President most of the "management flexibility" he
desired. 1
28
In fairness to the Administration, the final version of the HSA
does put some limits on the discretion of the President and
Secretary, and thus lessens the potential for abuse that the
Democrats feared. The Secretary may not abridge government-
employee rights to merit-based promotions, whistleblower
protections, or veterans' benefits. 129 Furthermore, the Secretary's
power to alter procedures protecting employees' rights to appeal
pay and discharge decisions is subject to a sunset provision: under
the HSA, this power will expire five years after the transition
121 See id.
122 Leahy Statement, supra note 87.
123 See id.
124 Id.
125 See Zengerle, supra note 111.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 See Thessin, supra note 29.
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period to DHS."3 ° In the meantime, the Administration retains a
remarkable degree of control over federal employee management.
The impact of the HSA-granted "management flexibility" on
federal workers is significant. As of March 2003, one in every
twelve federal workers was on the DHS payroll. 3' DHS
employees are working in all fifty states, Washington, D.C., and
forty-nine foreign countries. 132 A significant number of federal
employees will be affected by any administrative employment
policy. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that, over the next
five years, up to fifty percent of the federal labor pool will be
eligible for retirement.'33 Many critics of increased Executive
flexibility are worried that fear of suspension of bargaining rights
and civil protections might accelerate retirements, leading to a
critical shortage of federal workers. 134 While the Bush
Administration has cited the need for maintaining employee
performance and effectiveness 135 as a key justification for
"management flexibility," it is also likely that the historic power
grant could have the opposite effect: it could undermine agency
expertise by facilitating a massive exodus of experienced workers.
V. Conclusion
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 gave rise to
domestic security and international relations issues that have
fundamentally altered the cultural and political landscape in this
country. We have responded to the attacks on several fronts:
waging war in Afghanistan and Iraq, passing the USA PATRIOT
Act, and shoring up domestic security through passage of the
Homeland Security Act. The debates over the HSA provide a
microcosmic perspective on the constitutional issues that will
continue to present themselves in the context of an undefined and
perhaps unending war. The institutional power struggle between
Congress and the President will be a crucial component on all of
130 See id.
131 See Department of Homeland Security-The First Months, TRAC REP., Aug. 25,
2003, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/tracdhs/DHSreport030825.htmil.
132 Id.
133 See Thessin, supra note 29.
134 Id.
135 See id.
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these fronts.
President Bush's comparison of the DHS to the government
reorganization that took place under the National Security Act of
1947 is appropriate in more ways than one. The most obvious
sense is the sheer scale of bureaucratic redefinition that took place
under both acts. But the more important comparison is less overt:
both acts resulted in significant transfers of power to the
presidency. Where the NSA solidified the Executive's power over
foreign affairs, the HSA, in the name of homeland security, is
increasing the President's discretion and autonomy over domestic
matters.
In The Federalist No. 51,136 James Madison warned of an
inherent danger in a constitutional system comprised of separate,
coequal branches of government: each branch will have a
tendency to draw more power to itself.13 7 But, Madison noted,
systems such as ours are designed to check themselves against this
tendency:
[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the
several powers in the same department, consists in giving to
those who administer each department the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments of the others.... Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition.... It may be a reflection on human nature,
that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of
government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of
all reflections on human nature?... If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would
be necessary. 1
38
In the context of the War on Terrorism being waged on both
international and domestic fronts, the dangers inherent in the
abdication of one branch's institutional powers are illuminated. If
government truly is "the greatest of all reflections of human
nature," it only makes sense that the Executive has seized the
opportunity presented by the War on Terrorism to shore up its
institutional power. It also makes sense that Congress would
acquiesce to some degree, given the broad political support for a
136 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
137 Id.
138 Id.
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wartime president. But the fact remains that Congress is the
primary and most effective check on executive power in times of
war. In The Federalist No. 48, Madison saw fit to remind his
contemporaries that "[a]n elective despotism was not the
government we fought for."'39 Today it is Congress's duty to
check the President's power, and ensure that such a form of
government does not take hold.
DARREN W. STANHOUSE
139 THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison).
2004]

